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The annual appropriations process in the United States is broken.  In only four of 
the past 41 years have all appropriations bills been completed on time.  In January 2019, 
the U.S. entered the longest government shutdown in history.  The inconsistent delivery 
of federal monies causes several problems, most notably for the employees and 
contractors who work for the federal government, and the many institutions and people 
who receive benefits and/or services from the federal government.  Continuing 
Resolutions and lapses in appropriation also negatively affect hiring and retention of 
employees, harm the U.S. economy, and create inefficiencies and management challenges 
in government agencies. This policy proposal examines the history of the current 
budgetary process and considers options to provide federal appropriations in a more 
regularized and timely manager, resulting in improved planning within government 
agencies, increased efficiency in the provision of government services, and fewer 
disruptions for federal agencies, employees, and contractors.   
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SUBJECT: Fixing the Federal Appropriations Process 
 
I. ACTION-FORCING EVENT 
In January 2019, the U.S. government reached its longest shutdown in American 
history.1  For the past 21 years, every single fiscal year required one or more Continuing 
Resolutions (CRs) to fund the federal operations on a temporary basis.2 
 
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The annual appropriations process is broken. While fiscal years are supposed to 
start on October 1 of each year, in fact, CRs have been required to fund government 
operations in all but four of the past 41 fiscal years,3 making CRs and lapses in 
appropriations (government shutdowns) the norm, rather than the exception. Since 1977, 




                                                          
1 Zaveri, Mihir; Gates, Guilbert, and Zraick, Karen. ”The Government Shutdown Was the Longest Ever. Here’s the 
History.” January 25, 2019. The New York Times. Available at: 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/09/us/politics/longest-government=shutdown.html  
2 Desilver, Drew. “Congress has long struggled to pass spending bills on time.” Pew Research Center. January 16, 
2018. Available at: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/16/congress-has-long-struggled-to-pass-
spending-bills-on-time/ 
3 Heather Krause, Director of Strategic Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office. Testimony Before the Senate 
Subcommittee on Federal Spending Oversight and Emergency Management, Committee on Homeland Security and 
Government Affairs. February 6, 2018. GAO-18-368T. Available at: https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-18-368T.   
4 Ibid.  
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Chart 1: Percentage of Stand-alone Appropriations Bills Enacted on or Before Oct. 1 of Each 
Fiscal Year.5 
 
This uncertainty regarding the timing of appropriated funds, in addition to actual 
lapses, adversely impacts federal employees and contractors, government services and 
operations, recruitment and retention of staff, and the economy at large. The frequent 
uncertainty and delays also create inefficiencies and management challenges at federal 
agencies. While there are multiple ways to assess and calculate the impact of potential 
and actual lapses in appropriations, the following sections offer quantitative and 
qualitative examples based on past shutdowns and initial data from the FY19 shutdown. 
Taken together, the effects of inconsistent and partial appropriations are harming the 
economy, federal employees, and government services, and they are increasing 
inefficiencies in government operations. The FY2019 shutdown, according to Linda 
Blimes, “closed 25 percent of the government over a dispute that amounts to just .001 




                                                          
5 ©2017 Pew Research Center. Available at: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/16/congress-has-long-
struggled-to-pass-spending-bills-on-time/.  





Impact on Federal Employees and Contractors 
The most obvious group affected by government shutdowns is federal employees 
and contractors for the federal government. Payroll costs for “work not performed” by 
furloughed federal employees was “the largest direct cost” of the FY2014 shutdown, 
which covered approximately 6.6 million employee work days.7 
More personally, 57% of federal workers reported that the 2018-2019 shutdown 
negatively impacted their lives.8 Self-reports showed that nearly half (49%) of furloughed 
workers fell behind on their bills, more than a quarter (27%) missed a mortgage or rent 
payment, 13% fell behind on student loans, and 10% missed a tuition payment.9 More 
than a quarter (26%) of furloughed federal workers and contractors dipped into their 
retirement accounts to meet day-to-day requirements during the 2018-2019 shutdown, 
42% took on new debt to meet their obligations, and 40% borrowed money from family 
or friends.10 During the 2018-2019 shutdown, nearly a quarter of workers (23%) needed 
to borrow money or pull from their savings, nearly one-fifth (19%) had to pull from 
retirement, and 17% said they would need to take out a loan.11 Finally, more than 80% of 
federal workers who were surveyed after the 2018-2019 shutdown reported increased 
stress levels.12  
                                                          
7 Labonte, Marc. “The FY2014 Government Shutdown: Economic Effects.”  Congressional Research Service Report 
R43292. Page 30. Available at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43292.pdf.  
8 Smith, Ian. “Study Says Federal Employees Weren’t Prepared for the Shutdown. February 14, 2019. FedSmith.com. 
Available at: https://www.fedsmith.com/2019/02/14/study-says-federal-employees-werent-prepared-shutdown/ 
9 Prudential Insurance Company.  “Financial Fragility: How the Shutdown Affected the Household Finances of Federal 
Workers.” February 12, 2019. Available at:  
http://news.prudential.com//content/1209/files/financialfragility_how_the_shutdown_affected_the_household_fina
nces_of_federal_workers_prudential.pdf.  
10 Ibid.  
11 Smith, Ian. “Study Says Federal Employees Weren’t Prepared for the Shutdown. February 14, 2019. FedSmith.com. 
Available at: https://www.fedsmith.com/2019/02/14/study-says-federal-employees-werent-prepared-shutdown/ 
12 Prudential Insurance Company. “Financial Fragility: How the Shutdown Affected the Household Finances of Federal 





In recognition of the significant hardship experienced by federal employees, 
Congresswoman Jennifer Wexton, (D-VA) with a large constituency of federal works, 
introduced legislation that would “require the Federal financial regulators to issue 
guidance encouraging financial institutions to work with consumers and businesses 
affected by a Federal Government shutdown”13 as well as a bill to provide retroactive pay 
to public employees furloughed as a result of lapses in appropriations.14  
 
Impact on Government Operations and Services 
While it is difficult to fully capture the impact of shutdowns on government 
service provision, both program- and policy-related efforts, as well as mandatory 
spending programs, are affected. The Congressional Research Service categorized seven 
broad effects, including effects  on health (e.g. clinical research, disease surveillance, 
etc.); on law enforcement and public safety (e.g. delays in processing alcohol, tobacco, 
and firearms applications; postponement of recruitment testing and hiring; delayed 
processing of child-support cases, etc.); on parks, monuments, and museums (e.g. closure 
of sites and related loss of revenue from nearly 10 million visitors, etc.); on visas and 
passports (e.g. unprocessed applications for U.S. passports for American citizens and 
visas for foreigners); on veterans’ services (e.g. curtailment of services); on federal 
contracts (e.g. delayed issuance of contracts for essential and non-essential work, 
multiple issuances of short-term and interim contracts, etc.); and on the judiciary (e.g. 
rescheduling arguments, etc.).  
                                                          
13 U.S. House Resolution 2290 – To require the Federal financial regulators to issue guidance encouraging financial 
institutions to work with consumers and businesses affected by a Federal Government shutdown, and for other 
purposes. Introduced April 10, 2019. Available at:  https://www.billtrack50.com/BillDetail/1115873.  




Dozens of federal agencies and departments had to, according to Patrick Madden, 
postpone, delay, cancel, or disrupt “critical studies, tests and other programs” during the 
FY19 shutdown.15 One qualitative characterization by the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) of the impact of furloughs from the FY2013 shutdown read: 
Employees not on the job could not conduct food, product, and workplace safety 
inspections; prepare for flu season or monitor other public health issues; process 
tax refunds or respond to taxpayer questions; or provide numerous other services 
important to the general public and the economy.16 
 
Impact on Recruitment  
CRs and shutdowns also negatively impact the government’s ability to attract, 
hire, and retain the best possible workforce. During the 2018-2019 shutdown alone, 
according to a poll conducted by Clever Real Estate, 5% of federal workers reported 
quitting their jobs, 10% were actively looking for alternative employment opportunities, 
and 14% were considering looking for alternative employment.17 In an interview with 
Patrick Madden on National Public Radio, Paul Greenberg, a respected NASA scientist, 
said, “People are leaving…This is not just intellectual capability and continuity. This is 
frontline national security. We’re gonna have lots of great people leave because [of the 
shutdown] and we’re chasing away the next generation of talent that’s vital to the health 
                                                          
15 Madden, Patrick.  “Shutdown Stirs Fears for Federal Recruiting.” National Public Radio. February 11, 2019. Available 
at: https://wamu.org/story/19/02/11/is-some-loser-gonna-put-a-rover-on-the-moon-shutdown-stirs-fears-for-
federal-recruiting/  
16 Office of Management and Budget. “Impacts and Costs of the October 2013 Federal Government Shutdown.” 
November 2013. Page 4. Available at: 
https://www.aphl.org/policy/Documents/2013_FedGov_Shutdown_Impact_Report.pdf.  
17 Smith, Ian. “Study Says Federal Employees Weren’t Prepared for the Shutdown. February 14, 2019. FedSmith.com. 
Available at: https://www.fedsmith.com/2019/02/14/study-says-federal-employees-werent-prepared-shutdown/ 
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of our government.”18 CRs and lapses in appropriations also affect agencies’ ability to fill 
positions19 and “hurt morale in the civil service.”20 
 
Macroeconomic Impact 
Though there is no uniform method for assessing the costs of a shutdown, the 
economy as a whole is also negatively impacted by lapses in appropriations.21 Estimates 
from the 2013 shutdown ranged from $40 million to $80 million per day.22 Standards & 
Poor’s estimated the cost of the FY2013 shutdown at $1.5 billion per day.23 The wide 
range of estimates reflect the fact that there is no single definition of defining and 
calculating “costs.”24   
The Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers recently estimated that the 
2018-2019 shutdown reduced quarterly economic growth by 0.13% per week, the result 
of lost work from furloughed employees and contractors.25 Others estimated the number 
to be 0.15% per week.26  Whatever the number, January 15, 2019 White House 
                                                          
18 Madden, Patrick.  “Shutdown Stirs Fears for Federal Recruiting.” National Public Radio. February 11, 2019. Available 
at: https://wamu.org/story/19/02/11/is-some-loser-gonna-put-a-rover-on-the-moon-shutdown-stirs-fears-for-
federal-recruiting/. 
19 Heather Krause, Director of Strategic Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office. Testimony Before the Senate 
Subcommittee on Federal Spending Oversight and Emergency Management, Committee on Homeland Security and 
Government Affairs. February 6, 2018. GAO-18-368T. Available at: https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-18-368T.   
20 Blimes, Linda J.  “To Avoid Government Shutdowns, Fix the Budget Process.” The Boston Globe. January 
7, 2019. Available at: https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2019/01/07/avoid-government-shutdowns-
fix-budget-process/jFkhPFfyzXmuZVhvon2BVL/story.html. 
21 Congressional Research Service. Report RL34680. “Shutdown of the Federal Government: Causes, Processes, and 
Effects.” December 10, 2018. Pages 32-33. Available at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34680.pdf.  
22 Francis, David.  “The Shocking Cost to Taxpayers of a Shutdown.” The Fiscal Times. September 30, 2013. Available 
at: http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2013/09/30/Shocking-Cost-Taxpayers-Shutdown.  
23 Bruggeman, Lucien. “Here’s how a government shutdown could affect you.” ABC News. January 20, 2018. Available 
at: https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/government-shutdown-affect/story?id=52463538. 
24 Congressional Research Service. Report RL34680. “Shutdown of the Federal Government: Causes, Processes, and 
Effects.” December 10, 2018. Pages 32-33. Available at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34680.pdf. 
25 Greenberg, Paul. Quoted in:  Tankersley, Jim. “Shutdown’s Economic Damage Starts to Pile Up, Threatening an End 
to Growth.”  January 15, 2019. The New York Times. Available at: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/15/us/politics/government-shutdown-economy.html. 
26 Weisenthal, Joe. “Here’s How Much the Economy Will Suffer Every Week of a Government Shutdown.” Business 




projections of the FY19 shutdown acknowledged that it “weighed significantly on 
growth” and could force a contraction of the U.S. economy.27 
The economic effects of shutdowns are driven by the decrease in timely 
compensation for employees, reductions in government purchases, and decreased 
consumer confidence.28 Because consumer spending is roughly 70% of economic 
activity, delays in salaries can cause immediate short-term disruptions, and the data show 
that household spending of furloughed employees declines by 10% to 15%.29 The OMB 
has previously cited several types of “economic disruption” because of the cessation of 
government activities that drive the private sector, including permitting, reviews, 
licensing, IRS income verification for financial institutions, federal loans to small 
businesses, etc.30 The OMB’s report also cited the absence of the IRS income 
verifications’ ability for use by financial institutions in adjudicating loan applications for 
potential borrowers. Indeed, as furloughed federal employees and contractors have less to 
spend and change their purchasing patterns, they are unable to invest their income. More 
than one-third (38%) of federal employees said that the 2018-2019 shutdown forced them 
to delay buying a house.31   
                                                          
27 Tankersley, Jim. “Shutdown’s Economic Damage Starts to Pile Up, Threatening an End to Growth.”  January 15, 
2019. The New York Times. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/15/us/politics/government-shutdown-
economy.html. 
28 Committee for a Responsible Budget.  “The Economic Cost of the Shutdown.” October 2, 2013. Available at: 
https://www.crfb.org/blogs/economic-cost-shutdown.  
29 Baker, Scott R.  “What’s the economic impact of a government shutdown?” Public Radio International. December 
21, 2018. Available at: https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-12-21/what-s-economic-impact-government-shutdown.  
30 Office of Management and Budget. “Impacts and Costs of the October 2013 Federal Government Shutdown.” 
November 2013. Pages 2-4 and 8-12. Available at: 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/reports/impacts-and-costs-of-october-2013-federal-
government-shutdown-report.pdf.  
31 Smith, Ian. “Study Says Federal Employees Weren’t Prepared for the Shutdown. February 14, 2019. FedSmith.com. 
Available at: https://www.fedsmith.com/2019/02/14/study-says-federal-employees-werent-prepared-shutdown/ 
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The OMB previously estimated that the 2013 shutdown cost taxpayers 
approximately $2 billion in lost productivity, with an additional $500 million lost from 
visitors to national parks.32  The same assessment concluded that the shutdown also 
resulted in decreased private sector job creation, with a result of 120,000 fewer jobs and 
“badly damaged” consumer and business confidence.33 The Bureau of Economic 
Analysis estimated that real GDP growth in the fourth quarter of 2013 was reduced by 0.3 
points as a direct effect of the shutdown.34 The OMB also estimated that the 1995-1996 
shutdown cost more than $2 billion.35   
Finally, because furloughed federal employees have historically been paid their 
salaries retroactively, there is no cost savings during this decreased time of service 
provision.36 In the words of Gordon Gray, a think tank expert, “We are paying people to 
do nothing. That’s basically pure waste.”37 
 
Inefficiency and Management Challenges 
According to the General Accountability Office’s (GAO) Director for Strategic 
Issues, “CRs and lapses in appropriations leading to government shutdowns create 
inefficiencies and other management challenges for agencies,”38 and Linda J. Blimes 
                                                          
32 Office of Management and Budget. “Impacts and Costs of October 2013 Federal Government Shutdown.” 
November 2013. Available at:  https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/reports/impacts-and-
costs-of-october-2013-federal-government-shutdown-report.pdf.  
33 Ibid.  
34 Heather Krause, Director of Strategic Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office. Testimony Before the Senate 
Subcommittee on Federal Spending Oversight and Emergency Management, Committee on Homeland Security and 
Government Affairs. February 6, 2018. GAO-18-368T. Available at: https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-18-368T.   
35 Congressional Research Service. Report RL34680. “Shutdown of the Federal Government: Causes, Processes, and 
Effects.” December 10, 2018. Available at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34680.pdf. 
36 Ibid. Pages 14-15. 
37 Gordon Gray. Quoted by Tuttle, Brad.  “The Government Shutdown Will Cost More Than Trump’s $5 Billion Border 
Wall Funding, According to Experts.” Money. January 4, 2019. Available at: 
http://money.com/money/5494004/government-shutdown-costs-trump-border-wall/.  
38 Heather Krause, Director of Strategic Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office. Testimony Before the Senate 
Subcommittee on Federal Spending Oversight and Emergency Management, Committee on Homeland Security and 
Government Affairs. February 6, 2018. GAO-18-368T. Available at: https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-18-368T.   
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adds that “shutdowns end up costing taxpayers heavily in wasteful, last-minute 
spending.”39 Those inefficiencies take the form of additional artificial and repetitive 
work, such as entering into multiple short-term contracts and repeatedly revising budget 
and travel plans.   
Operational inefficiency also results from the OMB requirements for federal 
agencies to maintain shutdown plans or contingency plans of varying dates and 
timelines.40 These include determining which activities are exempted or still legally 
authorized during a lapse, estimates of the amount of time necessary to complete orderly 
shutdown, and the number of employees to be retained. Due to the annual uncertainty and 
inconsistency of federal appropriations, this effort must be expended for all potential 
funding lapses, actual shutdowns, and after a shutdown (backlogs of work).41 With 90% 
of fiscal year appropriations requiring at least one CR, that uncertainty can mean 
perpetual preparations, which divert employee and managerial resources away from 
normal business.   
Aside from lost productivity, there are also inefficiencies from the general 
budgetary uncertainty. When it comes to spending budgets, federal managers are forced 
to limit or delay spending during CRs because they are uncertain of the final 
appropriations. This can result in delayed contract and grant awards, which adversely 
impacts service provision and the quality of work performed, and it increases costs.42  
                                                          
39 Blimes, Linda J.  “To Avoid Government Shutdowns, Fix the Budget Process.” The Boston Globe. January 7, 2019. 
Available at: https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2019/01/07/avoid-government-shutdowns-fix-budget-
process/jFkhPFfyzXmuZVhvon2BVL/story.html. 
40 Office of Management and Budget. Circular No. A-11: Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget. June 
2018. §124. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/a11.pdf.  
41 Congressional Research Service. Report RL34680. “Shutdown of the Federal Government: Causes, Processes, and 
Effects.” December 10, 2018. Available at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34680.pdf.  
42 Heather Krause, Director of Strategic Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office. Testimony Before the Senate 
Subcommittee on Federal Spending Oversight and Emergency Management, Committee on Homeland Security and 
Government Affairs. February 6, 2018. GAO-18-368T. Available at: https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-18-368T.   
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The GAO found that it forces agencies to spend funds on lower-priority items because 




III. HISTORY & BACKGROUND 
Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution clearly designates budgetary functions, the 
“power of the purse,” to Congress by providing the authority to create and collect taxes as 
well as the power to borrow money.43 The constitution does not, however, specify how 
Congress should exercise its authority “or how the federal budget process should 
work.”44 Blimes explained as follows: 
The framers of the Constitution structured our system to give the executive branch the key 
role in budget formulation, while the spending function (the “power of the purse”) was 
put squarely in the legislative branch. This division of responsibility is fundamental to the 
idea of checks and balances. However, by placing so much authority for deciding on 
government revenue and spending in the hands of the legislature, the framers ensured 
that many competing interests would constantly vie for resources in Congress. This 
arrangement puts the budget at the heart of our democratic enterprise.45 
 
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 197446 provided the 
framework for the budget process and created a budget committee in each house of 
Congress “to allow Congress to develop an independent means to analyze the Presidential 
budget, reconcile it with congressional plans, and develop a fiscal policy of its own.”47 
Additionally, the Act established the Congressional Budget Office “to provide Congress 
with independent, nonpartisan analyses.”48 Together, the 1974 Budget Act and House 
Rule X established the jurisdiction of the House Budget Committee, which included the 
responsibility for “budget process generally.”49   
                                                          
43 U.S. Constitution. Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1. “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, 
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United 
States.” 
44 National Priorities Project. Budget process. Available at: https://www.nationalpriorities.org/budget-basics/federal-
budget-101/federal-budget-process/.   
45 Blimes, Linda J.  “To Avoid Government Shutdowns, Fix the Budget Process.” The Boston Globe. January 7, 2019. 
Available at: https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2019/01/07/avoid-government-shutdowns-fix-budget-
process/jFkhPFfyzXmuZVhvon2BVL/story.html. 
46 PL 93-344. 
47 House Budget Committee Website. History & Jurisdiction. Available at: Https://budget.house.gov/about/history-
and-jurisdiction. 
48 Ibid.  
49 Rule X: Organization of Committees at 1(d)2, available at: http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/house-rules.pdf. 
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 There are four major legislative acts related to the budget process, but they focus 
on controlling deficit spending and related enforcement and do not generally affect 
budgetary processes. Because of this, they are not discussed in this memo, which focuses 
on the budgetary process and not on spending levels. 
It is important to distinguish between authorization bills and appropriations bills. 
Authorization bills, as the Committee for a Responsible Budget explains, “create, extend, 
or make changes to statues and specific programs and specify the amount of money that 
appropriators may spend on a specific program... [and they] design the rules and set out 
the details for the programs.”50 Authorizations provide the legal authority to spend 
money and can be permanent, for a single fiscal year, or multiple fiscal years. They fall 
under legislative committees in each house of Congress, and not in the appropriations 
committees. 
At the same time, appropriations bills, the Committee for a Responsible Budget 
goes on, “provide the discretionary funding available to agencies and programs that have 
already been authorized.”51 Appropriations provide the finances for agencies to execute 
the programs established in authorization bills. They, the Congressional Research Service 
explains, “are characteristically annual and generally provide funding authority that 
expires at the end of the federal fiscal year…In recent years these [appropriations] 
measures have provided approximately 35% to 39% of total federal spending.”52 
Appropriations measures fall under the respective appropriations committees of each 
house of Congress. 
                                                          
50 Committee for a Responsible Budget. “Appropriations 101.” May 30, 2018. Available at: 
https://www.crfb.org/papers/appropriations-101.  
51 Ibid. 
52 Congressional Research Service. Report R42388: “The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction.” 
November 30, 2016. Available at: https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R42388.html. 
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The appropriations process covers the discretionary portion of the federal budget. 
The budget process does not appropriate funds for “mandatory spending,” which have 
funds accompanying their authorization and are spent automatically. There are three 
types of appropriations measures:  
• Regular appropriations bills provide most of the funding that is provided in all 
appropriations measures for each fiscal year and must be enacted by October 1. 
• Continuing Resolutions are used to provide temporary funding for operations in 
the absence of a budget for the fiscal year and generally provide funding at previous 
fiscal year levels.53   
• Supplemental appropriations bills “provide additional appropriations to become 
available during a fiscal year.”54 
For regular appropriations bills, the annual appropriations process55 has five key 
steps:   
1. Submission of a presidential budget request. The president’s budget is to be 
submitted to Congress by the first Monday in February,56 though in presidential transition 
years, Congress usually provides deadline extensions.57 The Office of Management and 
Budget prepares the president’s budget, which “details the administration’s position on 
the full range of federal revenue and spending. The request encompasses economic 
projections and analysis, as well as detailed program-by-program funding levels proposed 
                                                          
53 Ibid.  
54 Ibid.  
55 This memo uses “annual congressional budget process” and “appropriations process” interchangeably. 
56 31 U.S.C. §1105(a). 
57 Christensen, Michelle D. Congressional Research Service Report RS20752: Submission of the President’s Budget in 
Transition Years.” Available at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20752.pdf.  
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by the administration.”58 The president’s request, which is often several thousand pages, 
“has no binding authority…and is best understood as a detailed statement by the 
administration of its fiscal goals and policy preferences.” The president’s budget 
proposal, as A Brief Guide to the Federal Budget and Appropriations Process explains, 
“also projects deficits and surpluses for the government as a result of the 
recommendations in the budget for the immediate fiscal year, as well as the next 9 fiscal 
years.”59 
2. Passage of concurrent budget resolutions. Congress must respond to the 
president’s budget proposal through concurrent resolutions on the budget and is to be 
filed by April 15.60 The resolutions set the total level of discretionary funding for the 
coming fiscal year, known as 302(a) allocations. They do not require presidential action. 
Similar to the president’s budget request, these resolutions “often include multiple policy 
proposals…[which are] understood to be an effort by the majority to send a message 
about their fiscal priorities.”61 While the concurrent resolutions only allocate money for 
the upcoming fiscal year (or current fiscal year, if initiated after the start of a new fiscal 
year), it must also cover at least four subsequent fiscal years.62 Though the CBA 
establishes April 15 as the deadline for adoption of the congressional budget resolution, 
in 13 of the past 20 fiscal years, Congress did not adopt its resolution by the established 
date.63 There is no penalty if the resolution is not completed on time or at all, and in such 
                                                          
58 A Brief Guide to the Federal Budget and Appropriations Process. Available at: www.acenet.edu/news-
room/pages/a-brief-guide-to-the-federal-budget-and-appropriations-process.aspx. 
59 Ibid. 
60 P.L. 930344, as amended. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (CBA). 
61 A Brief Guide to the Federal Budget and Appropriations Process. Available at: www.acenet.edu/news-
room/pages/a-brief-guide-to-the-federal-budget-and-appropriations-process.aspx. 
62 31 U.S.C. §1105(a).   
63 Heniff, Bill. Congressional Research Service Report RL30297: “Congressional Budget Resolutions: Historical 
Information.” Available at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30297.pdf.  
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instances, Congress may adopt a deeming resolution to provide administrative and 
procedural remedies.64 
3. Markup by subcommittees. Each appropriations committee subdivides its 302(a) 
allocations for their subcommittees into 302(b) sub-allocations, which serve as spending 
ceilings for the fiscal year being considered. The subcommittees determine how to 
distribute the 302(b) sub-allocations to the agencies under their jurisdiction through 
consultation, testimony and hearings, and reviews of agency justifications. Each 
subcommittee then drafts, marks up, and reports its bill to the full appropriations 
committee. Each house of Congress votes on the appropriations developed by the 
appropriations subcommittees in their respective house. In the House of Representatives, 
the spending bill is considered by the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the 
Union, comprised of all members.65 Reconciliation should be completed by June 15.66  
4. Votes and reconciliation. Following the passage of appropriations bills in each 
house, a conference committee is appointed to reconcile the differences between the two 
versions of the spending bills.67 After resolving the differences and agreeing on language 
and spending, the House and Senate must pass identical versions of the bill. This is to be 
accomplished by June 30 for each appropriations bill, after which it goes to the president 
for consideration.68  
                                                          
64 Congressional Research Service. Report R42388: “The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction.” 
November 30, 2016. Available at: https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R42388.html. 
65 House Rule XVIII, Clause 3.  
66 Section 300 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, as amended (P.L. 93-344, 2 U.S.C. 631). 
67 This is the general procedures, though “agreement may be reached through an exchange of amendments between 
the houses.” Congressional Research Service. Report R42388: “The Congressional Appropriations Process: An 
Introduction.” November 30, 2016. Available at: https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R42388.html. 
68 Section 300 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, as amended (P.L. 93-344, 2 U.S.C. 631). 
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5. Signature into law. An appropriation becomes law upon receiving the president’s 
signature, which is to be accomplished by October 1, the beginning of the fiscal year.  
Currently, there are 12 distinct appropriations bills, each of which must be signed by the 
president to complete the appropriations process and make it law. This is called “regular 
order,” which should be completed before the start of the fiscal year on October 1. In 
reality, according to the American Council on Education, “Over the last few years, few if 
any of the appropriations bills pass in regular order, even those enjoying wide bipartisan 
support.”69  
If Congress is unable to follow this regular process to complete negotiation of 
each of the 12 appropriations bills individually, it has the option of negotiating some of 
them together. The process, known as an “omnibus” appropriation “allows for greater 
range of negotiation than any individual bill would and also makes a possible presidential 
veto over a particular issue less likely.”70 A so-called “minibus” measure can collectively 
provide funding for a few select agencies. Omnibus and minibus measures “may also be 
used to achieve a timely end to the annual appropriations process.”71 
In the absence of a budget under the regular or collective appropriations 
mechanisms by the start of the fiscal year on October 1, the budget authority of the 
previous fiscal year will expire, and unfunded government agencies must “cease non-
excepted activities due to lack of budget authority”72—a “shutdown”73—because 
                                                          
69 A Brief Guide to the Federal Budget and Appropriations Process. Available at: www.acenet.edu/news-
room/pages/a-brief-guide-to-the-federal-budget-and-appropriations-process.aspx. 
70 Congressional Research Service. Report R42388: “The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction.” 
November 30, 2016. Available at: https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R42388.html. 
71 A Brief Guide to the Federal Budget and Appropriations Process. Available at: www.acenet.edu/news-
room/pages/a-brief-guide-to-the-federal-budget-and-appropriations-process.aspx. 
72 Congressional Research Service. Report R42388: “The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction.” 
November 30, 2016. Available at: https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R42388.html. 
73 Essential services and mandatory spending programs continue to function under a lapse in appropriations. 
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government agencies are prohibited from operating without funding.74 To prevent a 
cessation of operations, Congress has frequently turned to CRs to provide for temporary 
funding for one or more agencies. The following chart illustrates the frequency and 







                                                          
74 P.L. 97-258, known as the 1982 Anti-deficiency Act (31 U.S.C. §1341(a)-1342 and 1349-1350). 
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Chart 2: Frequency & Duration of Continuing Resolutions from 1998 – 2018.75 
 
The chart above excludes CRs that funded portions of the government, leading to 
partial government shutdowns. The duration of such partial CRs varies by agency, as the 
following chart illustrates. Historically, those appropriations related to security and 
                                                          
75 FiveThirtyEight.com. From “20 Years of Congress’s Budget Procrastination, In One Chart.” February 7, 2018. 
Available at: https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/20-years-of-congresss-budget-procrastination-in-one-chart/.  
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defense tend to have fewer CRs, and those CRs do not last as long as those of other 
appropriations subcommittees. 
 
Chart 3: Average Annual Duration of CRs by Appropriations Subcommittee, FY1999-2009.76 
 
Assessment of current policy regime 
 There is no measure by which the current budget process is working well. The 
frequency and duration of CRs is increasing. The country recently experienced the 
longest government shutdown in history. There have only been four fiscal years in the 
past 42 when all regular appropriations were enacted before the start of the fiscal year. If 
something only works 1/10th of the time, it isn’t really working. As Stuart M. Butler and 
Timothy Higashi, in a recent Brookings Institution article, stated, “The federal budget 
                                                          
76 GAO Report 09-879: Continuing Resolutions: Uncertainty Limited Management Options, and Increased Workload in 
Selected Agencies. September 2009. Available at: https://www.gao.gov/assets/300/295970.pdf.  
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process is a costly embarrassment [that] threatens America’s international fiscal 
reputation and credit rating.”77 Alice Rivlin, a well-respected economist and former 
government official, recently testified that it is “frightening and embarrassing that the 
world’s most experienced democracy is currently unable to carry out even the basic 
responsibility of funding the services that Americans are expecting from their 
government.”78  
For a process that is supposed to be reliable and regular, it is widely recognized 
that “the timing of the various stages of the appropriations process tends to vary from 
year to year.”79  Unfortunately, the services of the government and the employees and 
contracts necessary for those services do not vary, creating the inefficiencies described in 
the Statement of the Problem and fueling a negative public perception.  
Public perception of Congress is already at historic lows and continues to decline, 
with a full quarter of Americans citing “dissatisfaction” with the government as the top 
problem in the country.  Frank Newport expresses his feelings thus: “The inability to 
reach agreement on how to fund the government would confirm these low opinions—and 
most likely make them even worse.”80  
This is not a partisan issue. Stuart M. Butler and Timothy Higashi wrote, 
“Members of both parties are gradually realizing that the current process angers 
                                                          
77 Butler, Stuart M. and Higashi, Timothy. “Three reasons to be optimistic about budget process reform.” March 15, 
2018. The Brookings Institution. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2018/03/15/three-reasons-
to-be-optimistic-about-budget-process-reform/  
78 Rivlin, Alice. Testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee. February 6, 
2018. Available at: https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/fso/hearings/terrible-no-good-very-bad-ways-of-
funding-government-exploring-the-cost-to-taxpayers-of-spending-uncertainty-caused-by-governing-though-
continuing-resolutions-giant-omnibus-spending-bills-and-shutdown-crises.  
79 Congressional Research Service. Report R42388: “The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction.” 
November 30, 2016. Available at: https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R42388.html. 





constituents and is not in either party’s long-term interest.”81 Furthermore, members of 
both parties recognize that Americans consider government shutdowns to be political in 
nature.82  Indeed, at some level, according to the Committee for a Responsible Budget, a 
“federal budget…reflects the values of a majority of Americans…yet many feel that 
process does not reflect their values.”83 
 
Efforts to Date 
 Biennial budgeting has been discussed since the 95th Congress (1977-1998)84 and 
every administration since Ronald Reagan has considered the prospect of biennial 
budgeting.85   
 On the executive side, the 1984 Pearson-Ribicoff Commission proposed that half 
of the regular appropriations bills each year ought to be considered by Congress.86 The 
1989 National Economic Commission (1989) and the 1993 National Performance Review 
(also known as the Gore Commission) were supportive of biennial budgeting. At the 
beginning of the Clinton Administration, the Gore Commission stated, “Considerable 
time could be saved—and used more effectively—in both the executive and legislative 
branches of government if budgets and appropriations were moved to a biennial cycle.”87 
                                                          
81 Butler, Stuart M. and Higashi, Timothy. “Three reasons to be optimistic about budget process reform.” March 15, 
2018. The Brookings Institution. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2018/03/15/three-reasons-
to-be-optimistic-about-budget-process-reform/. 
82 Newport, Frank. “Looming Shutdown Would Further Damage Government’s Image. January 17, 2018. Gallup. 
Available at: https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/225749/looming-shutdown-further-damage-
government-image.aspx.  
83 Committee for a Responsible Budget. “Appropriations 101.” May 30, 2018. Available at: 
https://www.crfb.org/papers/appropriations-101. 
84 Saturno, James V.  “Biennial Budgeting:  Issues, Options, and Congressional Actions.”  January 10, 2017. 
Congressional Research Service Report R44732. Available at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44732.pdf. 
85 Ibid. 
86 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration. “Report of the Study Group on Senate Practices and 
Procedures.”  98th Congress, 2nd session, S. Prt. 98-242. 1984. Page 21. 
87 U.S. Office of the Vice President. “Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less: Mission-Driven, 
Results-Oriented Budgeting.”  Page 59.  
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It is worth noting that this position was reaffirmed in the final budget submission of the 
Clinton Administration (2000), after years of bruising budget fights and what was then 
the largest shutdown in government history. The FY2004 budget submission of Clinton’s 
successor, President Bush, continued the sentiment, which stated that “a biennial budget 
would allow lawmakers to devote more time every other year to ensuring that taxpayers’ 
money is spent wisely and efficiently. In addition, government agencies would receive 
more stable funding, which would facilitate longer range planning and improved fiscal 
management.”88 
On the congressional side, some form of biennial budgeting has frequently been 
proposed and discussed frequently. The FY2004 budget also states, “Congressional 
action related to biennial budgeting first occurred in 1982” and has continued through 
nearly all of the Congresses.89 In 2011, according to Felicia Sonmez, “the Senate 
unanimously passed a bill stating that neither members of Congress nor the president 
would receive their basic pay during any government shutdown of longer than 24 
hours.”90 The one time that a vote on biennial budgeting made it to the House floor, in 
2000, it was only narrowly defeated by a vote of 217-201.91   
Recently, according to Romina Boccia, “Lawmakers from both parties appear to 
agree that the current budget and appropriations process is broken.”92 The shared 
                                                          
88 OMB. Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2004, Analytical Perspectives. 2003. Page 318. 
89 Saturno, James V.  “Biennial Budgeting:  Issues, Options, and Congressional Actions.”  January 10, 2017. 
Congressional Research Service Report R44732. Available at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44732.pdf. 
90 Sonmez, Felicia.  “Sen. Mark Warner introduces ‘Stop STUPIDITY Act’ aimed at preventing future shutdowns. The 
Washington Post. January 22, 2019. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/sen-mark-warner-
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frustrations led to the passage of the 2018 Bipartisan Budget Act, which established a 
Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform. The Committee 
was charged with providing “recommendations and legislative language that will 
significantly improve the budget and appropriations process.”93 The Committee held five 
days of public hearings and multiple meetings and working sessions to develop the 
recommendations and accompanying draft legislation as mandated by the Act.94 Among 
other things, the Committee recommended establishing “a biennial budget process by 
requiring budget resolutions to cover at least two years…while maintaining annual 
appropriations. Specifically, the budget resolution would provide two years of allocations 
to the Committees on Appropriations, which would then provide topline discretionary 
spending levels for each fiscal year of the biennium.”95 Despite remarkable bi-partisan 
support among the 16 members of the JSC and promising signs of real potential for 
passing major legislation, their efforts succumbed to political infighting unrelated to the 
merits of biennial budgeting: 
At the eleventh hour, however, outside the JSC torpedoed the Committee’s ability 
to crown its success with a final vote that met its threshold requirements. The central 
problem was that Senate leaders Mitch McConnell (R-KY) and Chuck Schumer (D-NY) 
could not agree on how the Senate would take up, and potentially amend, the JSC’s 
                                                          
93 P.L. 115-123. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018.  §30442(b)(2)(A)  February 9, 2018. Available at: 
https://budgetcounsel.com/%C2%A7296c-bba2018-section-30442-establishment-of-joint-select-
committee/.  
94 Congressional Research Service. The Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process 
Reform. March 26, 2019. R45111. Available at: 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=R45111.  
95 House Budget Committee. “House Budget Committee Chairman, Ranking Member Introduce Bipartisan 





report. That led Democrats in the JSC to fear amendments being introduced in the Senate 
that would undermine their agreements with Committee Republicans. As a result, all but 
two Democratic JSC members pulled their support for the final JSC package.96  
  Although it did not succeed in 2018, an election year—according to Stuart M. 
Butler and Timothy Higashi, “the JSC has been viewed as a valuable beginning, and its 
support for biennial budgeting and other steps will help to build momentum for those 
reforms in the future.”97 
 Numerous other senators and representatives have proposed related legislation. 
Since 2005, Senator Johnny Isakson (R-GA) has proposed legislation that would create 
“a deficit-neutral reserve fund for changing the federal budget process to a biennial 
budget.”98 In 2013, the amendment passed the Senate 68-31 with bi-partisan support, 
indicating that the issue has “gained new momentum.”99 
Senator Mike Enzi (R-WY) has introduced multiple pieces of legislation in recent 
years, elements of which include budgeting for a two-year period and separating the 12 
appropriation bills over different sessions of each Congress but with the defense 
appropriation bill considered each year.100 
                                                          
96 Butler, Stuart M. and Higashi, Timothy.  “How Can We Take Partisanship Out of the Budget Process? The Lessons 
from this Independent Committee Can Help.”  December 19, 2018. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-
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Congressman Reid Ribble (R-WI) introduced H.R.1610–Biennial Budgeting and 
Enhanced Oversight Act of 2015, which would amend the Congressional Budget Act of 
1974 and Congressional Budget Impoundment and Control Act of 1974 and appropriate 
House Rules to shift toward a biennial process.101 The proposal had “an amazing 225 
cosponsors,” as Alice Rivlin put it.102 
Other proposals have focused on minimizing or eliminating shutdowns through 
the provision of laws that would guarantee funding, something like an institutionalized 
CR. Advocates suggest that “without the threat of a government shutdown, Congress and 
the President would be able to enact regular appropriations without crisis atmosphere” 
and therefore ultimately pass more sound budgets.103 
Senator Rob Portman (R-OH) has repeatedly introduced legislation to end 
government shutdowns. Most recently, S.104, the “End Government Shutdowns Act”104 
in 2019, was to provide a kind of “automatic CR.” The legislation proposes automatic 
funding for any government agencies without an appropriation measure at the start of the 
fiscal year. The provision would expire upon the agency’s receipt of a full-year 
appropriation being approved. Senator Portman’s legislation has a tiered system for the 
automatic budgetary provision, with agencies receiving 100% of the previous fiscal 
year’s budget for the first 120 days and the percentage decreasing by 1% for each 
succeeding 90-day period. 
                                                          
101 H.R.1610 – Biennial Budgeting and Enhanced Oversight Act of 2015. Introduced March 25, 2015. Available at: 
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In 2018, Senator Perdue (R-GA), as part of the Joint Select Committee on Budget 
and Appropriations Process Reform, offered an amendment to proposed legislation that 
would have established “milestones” within the budget process and related penalties 
including “no recess or use of official funds for member travel if these funding 
milestones are not met.”105 In January 2019, Congressman Jim Cooper (D-TN) 
introduced H.R. 129, the No Budget, No Pay Act, which would “provide that Members of 
Congress may not receive pay after October 1 of any fiscal year in which Congress has 
not approved a concurrent resolution on the budget and passed the regular appropriations 
bills.”106 
In response to the FY19 shutdown, Senator Mark Warner (D-VA) introduced the 
Stop Stupidity Act, which would prevent future shutdowns by funding “all aspects of the 
government except for the legislative branch and the Executive Office of the President—
effectively forcing Congress and the White House to come to the negotiating table 
without putting at risk the economy or hurting the American Public.”107  
 
Key Actors & Stakeholders 
For the purposes of implementing this policy proposal, the key actors are all the  
members of Congress, since they alone have the authority to consider and pass the 
implementing legislation. The most influential of them are the House and Senate 
leadership and those sitting on the House Budget Committee and the Senate Budget 
                                                          
105 House Committee on the Budget.  115th Congress. December 19, 2018. Print 115-15. Page 47. Available at: 
https://republicans-budget.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/CPRT-115HPRT33612.pdf  
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Committee. Their views on biennial budgeting are considered in the Political Analysis 
portion of this memo below. 
As previously described, there are numerous stakeholders outside of the 
legislative branch. It is not grandiose to state that American tax payers, writ large, are the 
biggest stakeholders, as the provision of regular, efficient, and effective government 
affects them all as a result of their providing the money in question through payment of 
taxes. Additionally, nearly all Americans benefit from federal programs or monies either 
directly or indirectly, including through the provision of services that are funded or 
administered by the federal government.  
The largest single stakeholders are federal employees and contractors who rely on 
salaries and payments, 57% of whom said that the FY2019 shutdown negatively 
impacted their lives.108 Following closely behind those employees and contractors are the 
companies, organizations, and states that employ them and those that rely on federal 
money for revenue or program delivery.    
The Political Analysis section further discusses stakeholders and other key 
influencers.  
  
                                                          
108 Smith, Ian. “Study Says Federal Employees Weren’t Prepared for the Shutdown. February 14, 2019. FedSmith.com. 
Available at: https://www.fedsmith.com/2019/02/14/study-says-federal-employees-werent-prepared-shutdown/. 
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IV. POLICY PROPOSAL 
A) Policy Goal 
The goal of this policy is to provide federal appropriations in a more regularized 
and timely manner, resulting in improved planning within government agencies, 
increased efficiency in the provision of government services, and fewer disruptions for 
federal agencies and employees. The elements of a successful policy reform would be the 
following: 
• To increase predictability for federal agencies and employees 
• To increase the transparency of the budgetary process  
• To increase the timeline and improve the mechanism for communication between  
Congress and the president in budget formulation  
• To eliminate or decrease the possibility of government shutdowns 
• To increase Congressional oversight of appropriated funds 
• To improve confidence in Congress among the American population 
 
B) Policy Authorization 
This policy proposal has four main elements, all of which would be accomplished 
through the same authorization tools, namely an amendment to the Congressional Budget 
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Title I of this act established the House and 
Senate Budget Committees and charged them with drafting an annual budget resolution 
for the upcoming fiscal year and the four following years.109 First, the proposed 
amendment would instead require the budget committees to draft a biennial budget 
resolution. Second, the proposed amendment would replace the current non-binding 
concurrent congressional joint resolution with a biennial joint budget resolution, which 
would need to be signed by the president and then become law, while retaining the 
                                                          
109 Public Law 93-344. July 12, 1974. 88 Stat.297. Available at: http://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/BUDGET.pdf.  
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current annual process for budget reconciliation and appropriations bills. Third, the 
proposed amendment would amend the timing of the current budget process under the 
budget act and require the completion of the concurrent resolution by May 1 in odd-
numbered years. Finally, the proposed amendment would enumerate implications should 
Congress fail to pass a budget by the start of the next fiscal year. 
 
C) Policy Implementation 
This policy would be implemented by Congress itself through the debate, 
adoption, and passage of an amendment to the 1974 Budget Act. It would take effect with 
the start of the 118th Congress in January 2021 and the scope of the policy would 
ultimately be determined by the legislation. This proposal need not begin with the entire 
federal budget, nor all 12 annual appropriations. It could be tested for a limited period to 
assess the efficacy and impact. It could also be tested in conjunction with other proposed 
changes, such as dividing the 12 appropriations bills into three or four “minibus” bills. 
Similarly, it could be implemented in conjunction with the proposal by Senator Enzi 
providing for staggered appropriations whereby Congress would be required to pass six 
appropriations bills per year, instead of 12.110 
 
D) Policy Proposal  
This policy proposal has two primary elements. The first is a transition from an 
annual to a biennial budget cycle. Specifically, there would be a two-year budget 
resolution with annual appropriations. One important element of the proposal is a widely-
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endorsed recommendation to give the budget resolution the force of law by moving from 
a joint resolution to binding acts signed into law by the president, as “setting this basic 
budgetary framework early…would make the appropriations process run more smoothly 
and with more discipline.”111 Under this proposal, the first session of each Congress 
would develop and deliver a biennial budget, while as David Kendall and Jim Kessler 
explain, “the second session would focus on oversight of federal programs, authorizing 
legislation, and legislation needed to adjust budget laws for changing conditions or 
unforeseen events.”112 
The second element of the policy proposal addresses the regularity and timeliness 
of passing budgets by introducing a standard automatic continuation of government 
operations for 120 days in the absence of appropriations, as well as additional incentives 
(or disincentives) for Congress to meet its budget responsibilities. As explained in the 
115th Congress 2nd session, “Changes that would improve the incentives for the House 
and Senate to consider regular appropriations would likely have the effect of reducing 
reliance on CRs.”113 As previously described, the incentives/disincentives could take 
several forms, including: 
 No Budget, No Recess legislation 
 No Budget, No Travel legislation 
 No Budget, No Pay legislation 
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Because this policy proposal only adjusts the timing and sequence of the budget 
process—and not the authorities for authorizations, appropriations, or spending caps—
there are no associated costs to implement it.  
 
F) Target Audience 
This policy proposal is intended to improve the regularity and certainty of federal 
budgets. As such, the impact of the reform would target and positively affect a diverse 
array of stakeholders.   
First are federal employees and contractors, who would benefit by having greater 
certainty in their employment, salaries, and personal lives as a result of not having to plan 
for the possibility of gaps in work, pay, and vacations and the potential loss in salary 
from government shutdowns.  
The next targeted beneficiary is the federal managers who would have greater 
certainty in planning and implementing their budgets. The two-year time horizon would 
provide the ability to do longer-term planning. Additionally, they would benefit from 
huge efficiency gains, as they would no longer need to prepare multiple rounds of 
contingency operating plans for sequential CRs and potential lapses in appropriations.   
Because provision of government services and government-sponsored services would be 
more consistent and continuous as a result of this policy proposal, taxpayers and any 
recipients of those services would be benefiting stakeholders. 
Finally, states and municipalities that directly receive federal funds would benefit 




V. POLICY ANALYSIS 
The elements of a successful policy enumerated above are again referenced here, 
along with the corresponding measurements of success for each: 
Element of Effective Policy    Measurement Indicator 
Increased predictability for 
federal agencies and employees 
 
- Number of appropriations bills 
passed on time 
- % change in number of Continuing 
Resolutions per appropriations bill 
Increased transparency of the 
budgetary process and 
accountability for taxpayer 
dollars 
- Amount of time that committees and 
citizens have to review and contribute 
to legislative consultations and 
passages 
- % change to days operating for 
federal regulatory, oversight, 
whistleblower, and FOIA websites 
- % change in agency OIG days of 
operation 
Increase in the timeline and 
mechanism for communication 
and cooperation between 
Congress and the president 
- Number of days between budget 
agreement in principal (biennial joint 
budget resolution) and appropriations 
bills’ passage 
Elimination or decrease of the 
possibility of government 
shutdowns 
- Legislative change(s) implemented as 
sticks 
- % change in # of government 
shutdowns 
Increase in Congressional 
oversight of appropriated funds 
- # of oversight hearings per 
appropriation in a given appropriation 
Improved confidence in 
Congress among the American 
population.  
-    Public Polling. 
 
Comparative Examples 
Only a handful of countries and some of the main international multi-lateral 
organizations have experimented with two-year budgets, and none are completely 
analogous to this proposal. They also took place in countries with much smaller budgets 
and simpler appropriations processes. Based on this information, these examples offer 
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limited utility.114 While there is no equivalent to the U.S. economy in size and scope, the 
experience of the individual states in the U.S. can provide some historical context. 
Currently, 19 U.S. states use a two-year budget cycle, with many mixed 
combinations, such as an annual operating budget with a biennial capital budget, 
significant annual budgets within biennial vehicles, and others with staggered two-year 
budgets for operating and capital budgets.115 Though the clear trend since World War II 
has been toward annual budgets at the state level, some states have switched to biennial 
budgeting due to the same motivations as this policy proposal, namely reducing the time 
spent on routine budget matters and increasing oversight. Some states, such as 
Connecticut, employ biennial budgeting to “strengthen fiscal management by doubling 
Connecticut’s budget horizon from 1 to 2 years” as part of a contribution to broader fiscal 
reforms. Senator Jonny Isakson (R-GA) has frequently proposed legislation moving to a 
biennial budget. For example, he wrote that “biennial budgeting has been used 
successfully in a number of states”116 as one motivation. 
However, the U.S. Government Accountability Office issued a report at the 
request of Congress about the states’ experience and concluded that “the state experience 
does not provide any single answer concerning biennial budgeting.”117 The GAO report 
did conclude that the success of biennial budget cycles “will depend on the ability of the 
Congress and the President to reach agreement on how to design and enforce the off-year 
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process and how to respond to unanticipated needs.”118  Given the regularity and 
frequency of supplemental and emergency appropriations, that does not appear to be an 
inherent impediment, and the federal government has mechanisms that are “used to adjust 
fund availability and timing in response to program needs—such as multiyear funds, 
forward funding, and advance funding” that are not common in states.119 With regard to 
increases in oversight, the GAO report found that “there must be commitment to such 
oversight activities over and above any time savings,” which is an inherent element of 
this policy proposal. 
It is important to remember that no state can serve as a proxy for the federal 
government due to the size of the federal budget as well as its breadth, including issues 
such as defense and foreign policy, that states simply do not have. The applicability of 
states’ experiences is also limited because of the federal government’s unique features, as 
indicated by the GAO in its report, including controls on spending (the federal 
government has a unified budget while state budgets “separate operating, capital, 
enterprise, and various other funds”), differences in executive authorities between 
governors and the president, and the fact that “states generally do not have separate 
budget, authorization, and appropriations processes.”120 
Another illustrative example is the experience of presidential-congressional 
budget summits. The experience of five of these—in 1987, 1990, 1993, 1997, and 2011—
cited by the Congressional Research Service have “demonstrated the effectiveness of 
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establishing a multiyear framework for the budget.”121 Establishing this as a regular part 
of the formal process could recreate the success of those summits.   
 
Elements of Policy Analysis 
a) Impact 
Pros 
The policy would have a wide impact with multiple benefits. Biennial budgeting 
would serve to “reduce the number of redundant budget-related votes during each 
Congress, encourage longer time horizons in policy planning, and encourage greater 
stability in fiscal policy.”122  Many believe that biennial budgeting would also increase 
oversight by the relevant House and Senate committees as a result of the additional free 
time in the off-year legislative session, “an activity difficult to pursue given the annual 
appropriations cycle.”123 And, according to David Kendall and Jim Kessler, “A biennial 
budget would also increase predictability and stability for state and local governments, 
which rely on federal funding and regularly enter into joint ventures with the federal 
government.”124 
 Another major benefit of this policy recommendation would be brought about by 
the process necessary to make the concurrent Congressional budget resolution a legal 
joint resolution, which would:  
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bring the President into decisions about discretionary spending levels, mandatory 
spending reform, tax policy, and deficit reduction targets early in the process. This would 
encourage negotiations at the beginning of the budget cycle, thus providing certainty for 
the appropriations process. Policymakers would also take the budget more seriously and 
consider whether they are prepared to abide by its limits.125 
 Cons 
There are three primary risks associated with this proposal. However, similar to 
the pros, none of the risks are certain or guaranteed to actually become problems. 
First, there is no guarantee that a change to biennial budgeting would work. As Thomas 
Mann said, “Half as many formal budget and appropriations cycles may appear to reduce 
the opportunities for partisan and ideological conflict,” but “the void in the off-year” 
could be filled by non-regular appropriations and authorization legislation.126  
 Another risk of biennial budgeting is the law of unintended consequences:  “New 
rules change incentives, often in unanticipated ways. Measures designed to solve one 
problem can end up creating or exacerbating others. In times of intense political 
polarization, moreover, partisan objectives will often shape changes in budget rules.”127  
 Finally, opponents of biennial budgets believe that “a shift to biennial budgets 
would serve to further cede the legislative branch’s power of the purse, increase 
incentives for lobbying, and likely increase the number and size of supplemental 
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spending measures”128 as well as reduce “opportunities for serious budget debate,” by 
incentivizing “lawmakers to delay tough decisions…and discourages policymakers from 
setting clear visions for the values of our country,” and neglecting significant fiscal 
dangers.129 Proponents counter that argument by saying that “the fear that total control 
will pass to the President is not supported by state experience.”130 
b) Cost & Efficiency 
As previously mentioned, there are no identifiable costs associated with either the 
authorization or the implementation of this policy, as they are simply adjustments to the 
timing and sequence of the existing mechanisms of the budget process.   
However, there are noteworthy efficiencies gained from the proposed policy changes, 
some of them with substantial cost savings. These would come primarily through the 
elimination or reduction of the lost productivity and inefficiencies caused by CRs and 
lapses in appropriations cited in the Statement of the Problem above and articulated by 
Thomas Mann:   
A comprehensive biennial cycle is seen as encouraging long-term planning and 
evaluation over incremental budgeting; promoting greater predictability and efficiency in 
federal programs; eliminating excessive duplication and delay in congressional decision 
making; ensuring more vigorous congressional oversight of federal programs; reducing 
the enormous amount of busy work associated with the preparation of annual budgets in 
the executive branch and their review in the legislative branch and discouraging 
congressional micromanagement through line items, earmarks, and other restrictions in 
appropriations bills.131  
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There are other arguments for efficiency gains from a transition to biennial 
budgeting.  William Galston wrote, “First, it would reduce the congressional workload by 
eliminating the need to consider routine and repetitious matters every year …[which 
would] free up the second year for systematic oversight of programs whose efficacy and 
efficiency Congress seldom reviews,”132 leading to greater attention on the efficiency of 
individual programs and, presumably, reforms and reductions in those that do not work. 
Kendall and Kessler added, “A biennial budget would enable Congress to be a better 
steward of taxpayers’ dollars.”133 
Finally, as William Galston continued, “…a longer time-horizon would allow 
departments and agencies to implement their programs and administer their budgets more 
effectively.”134 The time spent on preparing budgets detracts from implementing and 
overseeing programs and policy. Kendall and Kessler wrote, “All of this time and energy 
is spent focusing on the next fiscal year without incorporating longer-term financing and 
strategic planning…[which leads to] vast resources, both in terms of human and financial 
capital, are wasted on repeating the budgetary process each year, a process that is 
needlessly short-sighted.”135 With biennial budgeting, “program managers would be able 
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to spend less time defending their budgets [and adjusting them for contingencies] and 
more time running their programs.”136 
However, this proposal is not intended as a cost-saving measure, and there is no 
uniform data or overall cost estimates of the inefficiencies of Continuing Resolutions and 
lapses in appropriations. Because of this, estimates of the potential savings through 
efficiency and service gains are not included here or as a primary indicator of policy 
success.  
c) Equality 
Several experts with differing ideological perspectives share the belief that one of 
the fundamental indicators of today’s broken congressional budget process is the inability 
of most people, lawmakers and average citizens alike, to actually understand the process 
and to be able to discern the contents of appropriations legislation before it is enacted.    
Norman Ornstein and Thomas Mann, two prominent figures in the debate on budgetary 
processes and fiscal controls, noted that the current process leaves conference committees 
to proceed “without any pretense of a full committee markup” and that the volume of 
Rules Committee emergency sessions to consider spending bills makes it “virtually 
impossible to discover what was in each conference report before voting on it.”137 
Furthermore, they explained that the “now-routine process” of omnibus spending 
bills are considered on the House floor “without any notice or time for members to read 
or absorb them.”138 This can result in “stealth legislation … [and it increases] information 
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asymmetry; promote[s] opportunistic, discriminatory behavior, and violate[s] the 
principle of equal political participation.”139 
By increasing the amount of time that members and staff have to consider 
appropriations bills and to provide oversight, the more likely that there could be “good 
public participation practices … [that would increase transparency –] a core value of 
governmental budgeting.”140  “A successful budget process assures that decisions are 
made in proper order and in a timely way.”141  
Similarly, because the size and complexity of the budget and the government 
continue to grow, relying on the same process for appropriations leads to “cutting last-
minute back room deals, the exact type of horse-trading most strongly opposed by the 
public.”142  As such, the proposed policy change to a biennial budget would also serve to 
improve the equality of the current legislative/appropriations process. And, because 
government shutdowns result in significant decreases in the operations of agency Offices 
of Inspectors General, whistleblower mechanisms, and Freedom of Information Act 
processing, any decrease or elimination of government shutdowns would serve to 
increase transparency and accountability.143 
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 There is no challenge of capacity—technical, administrative, or technological—
for the implementation of this policy proposal. In terms of collective congressional and 
staff capacity, “adjusting reauthorization periods so that most major authorizations could 
be scheduled for the second year of a Congress, floor time for the consideration of 
authorizations would not be in competition with appropriations.”144  
 However, Thomas Mann, a recognized expert, believes that the nature of 
economic forecasting would create a risk because biennial budgeting would require 
economic projections for accompanying budget proposals to be for 33 months, rather 
than 21 months, which could lead to “even more error than now…and invite partisan and 
ideological mischief.”145  Statistics demonstrate decreasing efficacy of budget 
projections. Stuart Young and Drew McLelland write, “From 1995 to 2006, budget errors 
averaged 4.23% for predictions one year ahead and 8.84% for predictions two years 
out.”146 Such errors would likely necessitate adjustments in the second year of the 
budget, but some believe that “the gains from better program performance through 
oversight would offset the risk of budget errors,” thereby mitigating the impact of 
imprecise projections. Experience at the state level indicates that these adjustments are 
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viable,147 and that “the necessity of projecting economic assumptions an extra year in 
advance” does not seem to be a major problem.148 
 Finally, the current annual process means that normal appropriations bills are 
subsumed by the context and by the urgency of larger issues, such as the Great 
Recession. In contrast, a biennial process would provide greater latitude to the president 
and Congress to have focused, targeted responses through supplemental and emergency 
appropriations, rather than being addressed in entirely by new appropriations bills.  
e) Efficacy 
Given the factors cited above, the efficacy of this policy proposal is estimated to 
be high. 
f) Legality 
 There is little threat that this policy proposal would have any legal impediments 
or difficulties. Some debate has arisen with regard to the constitutionality of withholding 
payment from members of Congress absent an appropriation, but that does not seem to be 
impassable.149 Otherwise, the stakeholders have the authority to act to amend the laws 
necessary to implement the policy change. The feasibility of them doing so is considered 
in the next section. 
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VI. POLITICAL ANALYSIS 
This is a politically achievable policy, based on the following factors. 
First, biennial budgeting is not a new idea, and it has a long history of discussion, 
consideration, and bi-partisan support. Galston explained, “Every administration from 
Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush has supported the idea” of a two-year budget cycle.150 
And Mann added that “biennial budgeting has attracted broad bipartisan support from 
Members of Congress and from…President [Bush] and his key budget officials.”151 At 
the legislative level, there have been consistent and bi-partisan attempts for 40 years to 
consider and change the annual appropriations process.   
Despite that executive support and congressional activity, the proposals to date 
have failed. In the realm of political battles, it is hard to determine precisely why the 
numerous previous attempts have been unsuccessful, but there are probably several 
reasons. Thomas Mann and Norm Ornstein cite a period of congressional leadership that 
“expressed zero interest in reform—which means no interest in institutional well-being, 
maintenance, or renewal.”152 They also claim that much of the failure to implement the 
changes needed…can be laid at the feet of Congress and its leaders. Why?  The most 
logical explanation…is…lack of institutional identify. Members of the majority party, 
including the leaders of Congress, see themselves as field lieutenants in the president’s 
army farm more than they do as members of a separate and independent branch of 
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government.153  This, in turn, has contributed to decrease in “serious oversight,”154 which 
is also at the heart of this policy proposal.  
While it is important to recognize and try to understand why those previous 
efforts have not succeeded, to date, we are in a fundamentally different political space 
now. The increasing frequency and duration of CRs and shutdowns has illustrated to a 
growing audience of stakeholders that the current process is fundamentally flawed. 
Furthermore, the FY19 shutdown, the longest in history, contributed to broad public 
displeasure with Congress and the inability of Congress and the White House to 
accomplish what most Americans regard as a fundamental task. Those factors contributed 
to the previous chairman of the House Budget Committee, Steve Womack (R-AR), and 
the current Speaker, Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), expressing support for biennial budgets, 
addressing the weakness in the leadership, as discussed above. 
By eliminating the inefficiencies caused by shutdowns and CRs as documented 
above, the OMB and the White House would be responsible for increasing efficiency in 
government, and with no accompanying financial cost. Furthermore, one of the 
anticipated benefits of biennial appropriations is that legislators would have more time 
for the oversight responsibilities, which should lead to increased efficiencies within 
federal agencies and their programmatic delivery.   
Another reason that augers well for implementation is that this policy change is 
politically expedient for both parties. Because biennial budgets have been discussed and 
proposed for more than 40 years and by five previous presidents, President Trump would 
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be able to rightfully claim that he accomplished something that none of his predecessors 
were able to do. Members of both parties in both houses of Congress would also be able 
to claim a political victory, first by finding common ground on a non-partisan issue, to 
the delight of their constituents and, secondly, without any real political consequence. 
The fact that this is a no-cost policy change—and one that would likely save 
money and increase efficiencies—is yet another important reason why it is politically 
viable. 
Finally, the ability to implement this proposal is that it is flexible in scope. As 
previously discussed, this does not need to be a wholesale switch for the entire federal 
government. It can be a time-based pilot for select or partial appropriations. This 
flexibility in negotiating would increase the likelihood of implementing the policy while 




 There are multiple stakeholders invested in the efficacy and reliability of the 
federal budgeting process who stand to benefit from the implementation of this policy 
change. Fortunately for this proposal, the number and diversity of the winners greatly 
outnumbers the losers. 
Members of Congress and the Institution Itself 
Members of Congress, congressional staff, and issue experts recognize that 
“annual fights about priorities between the same Congress and President do nobody any 
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good.”155 That has led, according to the U.S. General Accountability Office, to “many 
Members of the Congress [expressing] concern over the amount of time spent on the 
budget and appropriations process, as well as the seemingly repetitive process that 
includes concurrent resolutions, reconciliation bills, authorizations, and many regular 
appropriation bills.”156  
This frustration and accompanying political pressure has led to numerous 
proposals for legislation to switch to a biennial budgeting cycle, as previously described. 
While none of those proposals has passed, support within Congress can be gauged. As far 
back as 1987, 85% of representatives and 87.5% of senators “agreed or strongly agreed 
with the idea of appropriating on a two-year schedule.”157 More than 10 years later, a bill 
by Congressman David Dreier (R-CA) that expressed “the sense of the House” in favor 
of legislation for biennial budgeting had 245 co-sponsors.158 Power rests with committee 
assignments, and there is no loss in political influence when all members shift to a new 
timeline for budgeting, minimizing the perceived negative impact of this policy change. 
As an institution, any attempt to improve and normalize the budget process would 
benefit Congress itself, and be a small but important step in returning to the “regular 
order” that Thomas Mann and Norm Ornstein have repeatedly cited.  
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State and local officials  
State and local officials would also be supportive of measures to improve the 
regularity with which they receive federal monies, as shutdowns and lapses in 
appropriations, as Blimes put it, “wreak havoc on states and cities that rely on federal 
dollars.”159 
Private Sector 
 Though there does not appear to be a consistent, historic effect on the stock 
market as a result of lapses in appropriation, the economy as a whole is significantly 
harmed, as documented above. In expressing concerns of the business community, the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce cited $5 billion in damage to the U.S. economy.160 During 
the shutdown, the Chamber coordinated a “coalition letter” to the president and Congress 
from more than 650 state and national bodies making the following request: “On behalf 
of the American business community, we urge Congress and the administration to 
immediately take steps to restore the full operation of the federal government … [because 
of the] significant and in some cases lasting damage to families, businesses, and the 
economy as a whole.”161 The Chamber went on to say that, “of far greater and more 
lasting importance are the dislocations arising because government service has been 
disrupted.”162  
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Advocacy Organizations and Think Tanks 
With an issue as big and important as the federal budget, there is no shortage of 
think tanks and advocacy organizations that have analyzed the issue through their 
particular partisan lenses. While they may not be “stakeholders” in and of themselves, 
they are invested in the discussion, process, and policy of federal budgeting.  Because, 
according to the Congressional Research Service Report R44732, the “biennial budgeting 
includes several variations … [such as] multi-year authorizations, two-year budget 
resolutions, two-year appropriations, or some combination of the three,”163 it is hard to 
find analyses that are directly comparable. Many hypothetical criticisms analyze elements 
of biennial budgeting that are not part of this proposal, such as biennial appropriations. 
Because of this, many criticisms are not applicable. Even those most vehemently opposed 
to biennial budgeting have found compromise. For example, the Center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities has consistently published papers that conclude that “the disadvantages 
of biennial budgeting are likely to outweigh the advantages.”164 But, in recognition of 
mounting political momentum toward biennial budgeting, the Center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities concluded that “the procedure should first be tested on an experimental 
basis with a limited number of budget accounts. Another possibility worth exploring may 
be to institute biennial budget resolutions but maintain annual appropriations,”165 which 
is precisely what this policy proposal does.  
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Most importantly, government employees and contractors would be beneficiaries. 
More than 800,000 federal workers were affected by the FY19 shutdown, with, as Seth 
Moulton expressed, a “staggering personal cost to families.”166 There were consistent and 
myriad expressions of support from associations and unions representing government 
employees in opposition to the FY19 shutdown. The number of letters and campaigns 
against the shutdown is too extensive to catalogue here, but it includes the largest and 
most influential unions and associations, representing tens of millions of Americans, 
including:  
• The American Federation of Government Employees, which cited “extreme  
financial hardships” and “massive security risk” in calling the shutdown 
“unacceptable” and calling on Congress to re-open the government167 and 
subsequently filed a lawsuit  
• The National Treasury Employees Union, which also started a petition168 
• The National Federation of Federal Employees169 
• The Service Employees International Union170  
• The National Air Traffic Controllers Association sent a letter representing 33  
“aviation stakeholders” to the president and congressional leadership calling for 
an end to the shutdown,171 and subsequently filed a lawsuit172  
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In a press release, Max Stier made the following statement: “The inability of 
Congress to fulfill its primary responsibility of funding the government is a great 
disservice to the American people. The shutdown is the result of politics, partisanship and 
a badly broken budget and appropriations process. And it is the taxpayers who suffer, as 
they pay for services they do not receive.”173 He went on to clearly endorse budget 
process reform, saying:  
We must break the trend of funding our government for a few months, weeks or days at a 
time—it erodes the capabilities of our government on everything from national defense to 
the delivery of social services. Reasonable measures to help address this problem include 
a biennial budget cycle to forestall the yearly budget battles and allow more time to 
assess how agencies and programs are actually working.174  
 
By being able to count on receiving their paychecks in a timely manner, federal 
employees and contractors would be the largest single beneficiaries of a change toward 
biennial budgeting. It is important to note that the protests and complaints against the 
shutdown extended beyond federal employees to all major labor organizations, including 
the AFL-CIO175 and the Laborers’ International Union of North America.176  
 
Public Opinion 
 Public perceptions of congressional performance have been declining for decades 
in lockstep with the inability to have appropriations completed on time. In 1964, polls 
indicated that 77% of Americans believed the government would “do the right thing 
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always or most of the time;” In 1974, it was 36% and in 2012 it was 20%.177 According 
to a Pew Research Center study, “Only 17% of Americans today say they can trust the 
government in Washington to do what is right ‘just about always’ (3%) or ‘most of the 
time’ (14%)”—which statistics represent near historic lows.178 
 
Key Political Actors 
 As previously mentioned, while all members of Congress are essential actors—as 
the policy would directly affect their work—party and committee leadership is most 
important in analyzing this proposal’s political viability.   
Among leadership in the House and Senate, both the Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) and 
the Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) are on record as being in strong support.179 
Within the House Budget Committee, both Chairman John Yarmuth (D-KY) and ranking 
member Steve Womack (R-AR) are on record in support of biennial budgeting.   
On the Senate side, during the 113th Congress, in what Will Dobbs-Allsopp called “a 
successful 2013 show-vote, both Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) and 
Minority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) voted in favor of moving to a biennial process.”180 
Current Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) is not on record in favor or in 
opposition to the idea of biennial budgeting, but Budget Committee Chairman Mike Enzi 
(R-WY) is a strong advocate, as previously mentioned. Ranking Member Bernie Sanders 
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(I-VT) does not have a stated position on biennial budgeting. However, Senator Sanders 
recently hired Ethan Rosenkranz to be on his policy team. Given that Rosenkranz comes 
from the Project on Government Oversight, which frequently cites Pentagon waste as a 
major budgetary issue, it seems reasonable that considering a bi-partisan proposal such as 
this would be amenable to Senator Sanders if the possibility for increased oversight was a 
potential outcome.181   
Ultimately, the size, diversity, and political weight of the advocates trump those 
of the opponents. 
  
                                                          





There is little more important than a functioning budget for a country the size of 
the United States. The current system is broken and the implications are dire. Blimes 
explains, “The deterioration of the budget process is dangerous. Empires have fallen due 
to failure to tradeoff between guns and butter in accordance with public wishes.”182 The 
Committee for a Responsible Budget adds:  
While there may be both benefits and issues with budgeting biennially, one this is clear: 
the current budget process is broken. Reforms to the budget process that give our government 
better insight into how our budget functions and how to effectively implement strategy and 
achieve policy changes should be explored. Biennial budgeting is one such reform that offers 
some promise.183 
Nonetheless, it must be recognized that there are uncertainties associated with this 
proposal. It is impossible to know definitively how this policy change will work. But the 
risks are also uncertain, and opponents of biennial budgeting qualify their concerns with 
uncertainty: The U.S. General Accountability Office wrote that “it may not increase 
congressional oversight”184 of that the anticipated benefits and “could prove to be 
illusory”185 (emphasis added.) Ultimately, the potential rewards and benefits far outweigh 
the possible risks, which are essentially its limited efficacy and not new negatives. 
What is certain is that current system is not working, and the impacts and negative 
effects are increasing with each new fiscal year, each new CR, and each shutdown. No 
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system that works 1/10th of the time can be considered viable, and the trend under the 
existing process is toward increasing negative impacts. More than 40 years after the 
enactment of the legislation that established the modern budgetary process, it is time for a 
change. As Brian M. Riedl expressed, “The past 30 years have shown that a budget 
process does not last longer than 10 to 12 years before mounting abuses necessitate major 
reforms. The last major reforms, enacted in 1990, hung on by a thread before expiring in 
2002.”186 
This policy proposal may not be perfect, and it is not intended to solve all of the 
attendant problems with the budgeting and American fiscal policy; however, the risks of 
trying this on a partial and experiment basis are not grave. As Mann said, “I am sure the 
Republic would survive an experiment in biennial budgeting, especially if it is authorized 
with an explicit sunset provision,” as proposed in this policy.187 And as Alice M. Rivlin 
added, “In truth, Congress has already migrated toward two-year budgeting, by 
effectively setting caps on discretionary spending for two consecutive years.”188 Some 
agencies, such as The Department of Veterans Affairs, already receive a biennial budget. 
Blimes concluded, “The simplest way to minimize budgetary disruption is to extend this 
cycle to the rest of government.”189 
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The flexibility of the proposal allows for a trial period, and would provide both 
quantifiable and qualitative evidence of the efficacy of the proposal. Implementing the 
policy with a sunset provision is politically feasible and would provide the data necessary 
to compare how well the policy worked, committee-by-committee, appropriation-by-
appropriation, for future consideration and analysis. 
Proposing and working with Congress to enact the appropriate legislation would 
provide a unique opportunity for coordinated, positive legislation that is not bi-partisan in 
nature—something that the American public is desperate to see and would therefore be 
perceived very well as we head into a presidential election year. Riedl, explained, 
“Congress should resist the temptation to reflexively vote to continue the current process. 
This [current] process—which has engendered shortsighted, haphazard decision 
making by those who can manipulate the process— will not efficiently allocate the 
nation’s resources to its highest, crucial priorities.”190  
Ultimately, it is time to test this long-debated option, at least for a limited period, 
as an attempt to update a clearly broken system. Kendall and Kessler wrote, “A 
comprehensive biennial budget cycle would encourage more vigorous oversight of 
federal programs. Biennial budgeting make the budget process more efficient, reduce 
needless duplication, and free executive agencies and Congress to better attend to the 
concerns of the American citizens.”191 
This is not a silver bullet and it will not solve all of the problems in the budget 
process, fiscal policy, or state of political discourse. Mann explained, “Our current 
                                                          
190 Riedl, Brian M. “What’s Wrong with the Federal Budget Process.” January 25, 2005. The Heritage Foundation. 
Available at: https://www.heritage.org/budget-and-spending/report/whats-wrong-the-federal-budget-process. 
191 Kendall, David and Kessler, Jim.  “Biennial Budgeting: Better Value for Taxpayers. September 28, 2010. Third Way. 
Available at: https://www.thirdway.org/report/biennial-budgeting-better-value-for-taxpayers. 
56 
 
process is already highly contentious, and will continue to be for the foreseeable future 
whether the budget is done every year or every other year.”192 If that is the case, then 
Kendall and Kessler are correct in asserting that:  
as long as the process will be political…it makes sense for it to be structured in a way 
that better achieves our true objective—effective use of public funds…No procedural fix 
can substitute for the tough substantive policy decisions that Congress will be forced to 
make to curb our ever-increasing deficits. That does not mean, however, that we should 
not create the best environment in which Congress is making those decisions.193 
 
Just a few months ago, Congressman Steve Womack (R-AR) succinctly summed 
up the state of affairs thus: “The most important role given to Congress under the 
Constitution is the power of the purse, yet we regularly and repeatedly cede our 
responsibility to fulfill this essential duty….Clearly our budget process is broken.”194  
When the Chairman of the House Budget Committee makes such definitive 
statements—subsequently agreed to by the current Speaker of the House195—it is time to 
try something to improve the process. This proposal offers a moderate, flexible, no-cost, 
reversible, and politically feasible opportunity to do so. The beneficiaries are numerous 
and diverse. The cost to skeptics is limited. The time has come, and the White House and 
the OMB should take the lead in proposing such a change and devote some political 
capital to chart a path for implementation. As Seth Moulton put it, “Shutdowns cause far 
too much damage economically, personally, and institutionally to be taken in stride.”196  
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